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 One of the most pressing issues that continues to confront policy-makers, employers and 
individuals is that the growth in health care costs have exceeded the growth of per capita incomes, 
wages, and the price of other goods for several decades.  In 1960 annual per capita health spending 
was $809 (in 2009 dollars) and by 2009 it had increased to $7375, for an average annual growth rate 
of 4.6 percent (Chernew and Newhouse 2011).  Over this same period, inflation-adjusted per capita 
income increased by 1.8 percent.1  This large and persistent growth in health care spending was an 
important issue in the debate over the Affordable Care Act and is a top concern for employers and 
workers because the vast majority of the under-65 population who have health insurance coverage 
receive their coverage as part of an employee compensation package. The growth in health care 
costs is also central to the long-term prospects for the federal and state government budgets through 
its effects on the cost of publically-provided insurance and on the costs to provide health insurance 
to public-sector workers. This paper investigates the incidence of rising health insurance premiums 
using a unique data set from over 600 public school districts in Illinois that tracks wages, health 
insurance premiums, and employee premium copayments for public school teachers from 1990-91 
through the 2007-2008 school years.   
 While employer-provided health insurance premiums and total employment costs have been 
rising steadily over the last half-century, employees’ monetary compensation has remained relatively 
flat. Economists traditionally interpret the disparity in these trends as partially reflecting an implicit 
(and sometimes explicit) trade-off that employees make between salary, other forms of 
compensation, and job attributes more generally. As health insurance costs increase, employees are 
increasingly willing to accept slower wage growth to maintain their health benefits. A long line of 
                                                 
1 Per capita personal income in 1960 was $14,651 (in 2009 dollars) and in 2009 was $35,115. Data on personal 
income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts. Data on the 
Consumer Price Index is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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empirical research, however, has failed to find clear evidence that health insurance costs are borne 
by employees, which calls into question the long-standing views most economists hold about the 
incidence of rising health insurance costs and, more generally, whether the labor market operates as 
a sorting mechanism based on employer and employee preferences for employer-provided health 
benefits.  
 This paper estimates the trade-off between salary and health insurance costs using a unique 
data source on salary and benefits provided to public school teachers in over 600 schools districts in 
Illinois between 1991 and 2008. Public school teachers are an interesting and important group to 
study: there is a widely-held belief that public-sector employees receive higher compensation than 
what they would earn in the private-sector and much of the disparity is driven by differences in 
employee benefits. Recent attempts in Wisconsin and Ohio to restrict collective bargaining by 
public-sector employees were predicated, in part, on the desire to reduce compensation costs in 
general and employee benefit costs in particular. A similar debate is going on Illinois, where there are 
policy proposals to reduce the value of pensions for public-sector workers. These debates generally 
ignore the possibility that salaries and benefits are jointly determined, so attempts to reduce benefit 
costs will generally put upward pressure on salaries to maintain the same quality workforce.  
 Illinois public school teachers are also interesting to study because we have an almost ideal 
dataset to examine the trade-off between salary and benefits and can address some of the empirical 
limitations that have plagued past work. The salary survey that we use includes information on the 
premiums for individual and family health insurance plans and the fraction of the premium that is 
paid by the teacher through a so-called premium copayment (i.e. through regular salary deductions).  
These premium copayments are important and have not been well-studied in the literature. 
According to nationally-representative survey data compiled by the Kaiser Family Foundation, 84 
percent of workers covered by employer-provided insurance paid a premium copayment for their 
individual insurance in 2011, up from 76 percent in 2002.2  These premium copayments accounted 
for 18 percent of the premium for individual coverage in 2011 and 28 percent of the premium for 
                                                 
2 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (2011). These data refer to private-
sector and public-sector employees, excluding employees of the federal government.  
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family coverage.3  Our data on Illinois school district compensation contracts thus allows us to 
directly measure the correlation between changes in insurance premiums, salaries, and premium 
copayments.  
 Economic theory offers a clear prediction about the relationship between wages, health 
insurance costs, and total compensation. When both employees and firms are willing to substitute 
insurance (and other benefits) for some of their salary, exogenous changes in the value of benefits 
will be offset by changes in salary, leaving total compensation unaffected. This is true both in a 
competitive spot labor market, where the labor market serves as a sorting devise to match workers 
and firms who share a preferred mix of salary and benefits, as well as in a union-management 
negotiation, which is the case we study.  In union-management contract negotiations, management is 
concerned about the total compensation an employee receives and how the mix of wages and 
benefits affects workforce quality; unions will negotiate a compensation level and mix that a majority 
of members will support. A long line of research, however, has been largely unsuccessful in 
estimating a meaningful trade-off between health insurance and wages (Currie and Madrian 2000).  . 
 Data problems, as opposed to poor theory, have been the primary reason offered to explain 
why it has been difficult to empirically measure wage offsets from rising health insurance costs. One 
frequently cited reason for the lack of empirical support is that typical data sources have poor 
measures of individual productivity. An OLS regression often finds a positive association between 
wages and health insurance, which simply reflects the fact that higher skilled workers tend to receive 
both high wages and more benefits. It is exceedingly difficult to adequately control for individual 
productivity and remove this omitted variables bias. A second reason is that data on employee 
                                                 
3 The National Compensation Survey conducted by the BLS for 2011 found that among all civilian employees 
with employer provided health benefits, employees paid for 21 percent of the cost of individual coverage and 
33 percent of the cost of family coverage through premium copayments that were deducted from a worker’s 





premium copayments are not part of many datasets used to study the wage-health insurance trade-
off. Thus, to the extent that adjustments occur though premium copayments, the relationship 
between gross compensation and the level of health insurance benefits will understate the overall 
relationship between wages and insurance premiums.  
 Our analysis indicates that total health insurance costs rose for Illinois teachers at the same 
rate as they did nationally. We find no evidence that changes in teachers’ salaries within a district 
over time are related to changes in insurance premiums.  The absence of an estimated salary offset 
for teachers does not mean teacher take-home pay did not fall when premiums increased:  Rising 
premium costs were offset by rising teacher premium copayments; teachers paid about 17 cents in 
higher premium copayments for each dollar increase in the cost of individual health insurance and 
about a 46 cent premium copayment increase for each dollar increase in the cost of family coverage. 
Offsets through premium copayments are larger in districts that have longer-tenured (thus older) 
teachers: a one-year rightward shift in the teacher tenure distribution increases the teacher premium 
copayment by an additional 3 cents for each dollar increase in premiums. We find no evidence that 
rising health insurance premiums reduce districts’ demand for teachers or that districts substitute 
less-experienced teachers when health costs rise.  
We draw two conclusions from these results.  First, cash compensation partially adjusts to 
rising premium costs, though all of the adjustment comes through premium copayments and not 
through negotiated salary levels.  Second, that the premium offset is significantly larger in districts 
with an older workforce is consistent with older workers placing a higher value on the health 
benefits associated with higher premiums.  
 
2. The Relationships between Health Insurance Premiums, Wages and Employee  
The starting point for understanding how wages and premiums respond to changes in health 
insurance premiums begins with the model used to explain differences in wages and health insurance 
premiums across employers at a point in time.  Goldstein and Pauly (1976) were the first to develop 
a formal model of this relationship.  They assume workers are perfectly exchangeable in the 
production process, face the same expected health care costs and differ only in their level of risk 
aversion.   Workers have preferences for take-home salary,	, and health benefits, ℎ , and 
maximize utility  = (, ℎ(risk	aversion, where take-home salary is the difference between 
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the employee’s nominal salary, ,  and the employees’ health insurance premium copayment or 
contribution, ;	and the utility of health insurance is solely a function of worker risk aversion.   
Total labor cost per worker is identical across firms and is equal to the marginal revenue product of 
a worker, and is also equal to cash compensation plus the cost of health insurance.  The budget 
constraint produces a set of equilibrium salary levels and health insurance premium combinations 
that trace out a hedonic wage function  = (ℎ, a level of take-home salary for each observed 
level of health insurance. This equilibrium implies a marginal condition that −  =⁄  
(ℎ): the 
employees’ marginal rate of substitution between health insurance and salary, which depends on risk 
aversion, is equal to the marginal change in salary that results from a marginal change in health 
insurance, i.e. the “price” of health insurance in terms of reduced salary.  Differences in worker risk 
aversion mean that firms offer different combinations of cash compensation and health insurance 
benefits to match the distribution of worker preferences and each worker is matched to a firm that 
offers the compensation package that maximizes her utility.  This sorting of workers across firms 
means an employer need offer only one health insurance plan because all workers in the firm have 
identical risk preferences.   
The Goldstein and Pauly model produces the well-known negative trade-off between wages 
and fringe benefits.  There is a distribution of wage-health insurance offerings solely because of 
different worker preferences. The tradeoff does not require differences across employers in either 
the costs of offering health insurance or in any benefits health insurance might provide to an 
employer in attracting or retaining more productive workers. The negative relationship between cash 
compensation and health insurance premiums continues to hold when the model’s assumptions are 
relaxed and heterogeneity is allowed in worker productivity, expected health care expenditures, the 
costs and benefits to employers from offering health insurance, and when we move from a 
competitive spot labor market to a unionized setting. 
The trade-off between wages and health insurance is empirically estimated using a hedonic 
wage regression that expresses an individuals’ take-home cash compensation, , as a function of the 
cost of employer-provided health insurance (and possibly other job attributes) (Brown 1980; Rosen 
1986). Take home salary is equal to the wage rate, , less the employees’ contribution to their 
health insurance premium, , or: 
(1)         =  −  =  + ℎ +  ! + " ,	 
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where	 is a constant term, !,	are individual characteristics that are potentially correlated with 
health insurance that affect worker  productivity, and "   is an unobserved error term. The parameter 
 captures the trade-off between health insurance and take-home salary. If  = −1 then a dollar 
increase in health insurance costs translates directly into a dollar less of take-home pay and premium 
increases are fully offset by a decline in cash compensation. Since health insurance is not taxed as 
income, a dollar-for-dollar tradeoff implies that teachers capture all of the favorable tax treatment of 
health benefits. If, in response to a dollar increase in premiums, a districts reduces cash 
compensation by a dollar, total labor costs to the employer remains unchanged but an employee’s 
after-tax income declines by only  (1-Marginal Tax Rate). Alternatively, the employer captures all of 
the tax benefit if the parties agree to reduce take-home pay by 1/(1-Marginal Tax Rate) when 
premiums increase by a dollar.  
 Most studies fail to empirically confirm the negative relationship between wages and health 
insurance premiums, though there are some notable exceptions.4 For example, Eberts and Stone 
(1985) study public school teachers in New York and find that each dollar increase in health 
insurance costs between 1972 and 1976 was offset by about an 83 cent decrease in salary. Olson 
(2002) finds a negative effect of employer coverage on wages for married women working full-time 
using husband’s own employer coverage, husband’s union status, and husband’s firm size as 
instruments. Baicker and Chandra (2006) find evidence of a fully compensated offset for those 
covered by employer-provided health insurance using medical malpractice settlement size as an 
instrument for health insurance costs. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) study the 2006 Massachusetts 
health insurance mandates and conclude that wages adjusted to fully offset the cost of employer-
provided health insurance. Notably most of these studies estimate a compensating difference 
between jobs with and without health insurance. By contrast, we focus on how compensation 
adjusts to year-to-year changes in the cost of health insurance among people who are insured. In 
                                                 
4  See Currie and Madrian (2000) for a review of the earlier literature. Also see Levy and Feldman (2001), 
Simon (2001), Lehrer and Pereira (2007), and Royalty (2008). 
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addition, none of these studies estimate how premiums affect worker take-home pay through 
changes in employee premium copayments.5  
A number of other studies have found a relationship between wages and individual 
characteristics that correlate with the demand for health care.  Gruber (1994) found that working 
women of child-bearing age with health insurance saw their wages decline when their state required 
insurance policies issued by insurance companies were required to offer maternity benefits.  Sheiner 
(1999) found a flatter age-earnings profile for workers in markets with high medical care prices. 
Pauly and Herring (1999) found that predicted medical expenditures have a negative impact on the 
wages of older workers. Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) found a significant wage differential 
between obese and thinner women for those covered by health insurance, but no differential for 
those without insurance. While all of these studies are consistent with the predictions from the 
theory,  on the whole, there is very little direct  evidence that increases in  health insurance 
premiums are fully offset by a decline in cash compensation .  
The most common explanation offered for the lack of empirical support for the model is the 
presence of unobserved worker productivity that is positively correlated with the cross-sectional 
variation wages and either health insurance premiums or health insurance coverage.6    Indeed, our 
analysis of nationally-representative, cross-sectional data from the American Community Survey 
reveals a positive relationship between wages and being covered by employer-provided health 
insurance. As we show below, there is also a positive cross-sectional correlation in our data on 
Illinois teachers between the salaries paid to teachers who have identical levels of education and 
teaching experience and health insurance premiums.  This suggests it is likely to be very difficult for 
                                                 
5 Baicker and Chandra’s estimate of the wage offset is based on the interaction term between health insurance 
coverage, as reported by the CPS respondent, and the predicted premium from the first stage IV regression. 
They cannot estimate a similar model for employee premium copayments because premium copayment data 
are not collected in the CPS survey. 
6 See Smith and Ehrenberg (1983) for an early discussion of the econometric and data problems in estimating 
the wage-fringe benefit relationship in the context of wages and pensions. 
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researchers to be confident they are comparing the wages and premiums for workers that face an 
identical budget constraint, that defined by their marginal revenue product.   
 The lack of data on the employee’s premium copayment,	, may also explain why past 
empirical research has often failed to negative relationship between wages and insurance.  The 
Kaiser Family Foundation surveys show that from 1999 to 2011 the mean nominal premium for 
family coverage among private sector employers increased from $5791 to $15,073 and the mean 
premium copay has remained virtually unchanged at 27 percent of the mean premium, suggesting 
that premium copayments have been an important mechanism for shifting some of the premium 
cost increases to workers through lower take-home pay.7   Our Illinois teacher data show the 
teachers’ premium copayment on a family policy has remained relatively unchanged from 1990-91 to 
2007-2008 at 34 percent of the total premium.8 Examining solely the relationship between salaries 
and health insurance costs, without incorporating premium copayments, will miss a major 
mechanism through which take-home pay adjusts to higher premium costs.   
 The prediction of a dollar-for-dollar trade-off (ignoring the role of taxes) between take-home 
pay and the cost of health insurance is based on a particular set of assumptions. In the Goldstein-
Pauly model, employers provide health insurance and employees are willing to pay for these benefits 
in the form of lower wages because the cost of health insurance is less than, or equal to, the value 
employees place on the protection the plan provides from unanticipated health shocks to a worker 
or her dependents. However, health insurance premium differences across firms at a point in time, 
or within firms over time, will reflect many factors, such as increased health costs due to 
technological advancements, the size and health status of the employee pool, and the characteristics 
of the health plan (i.e. deductibles, etc.). Some of these factors, such as the degree of cost sharing, 
may be easily apparent to employees; others may not. Importantly, not all of the factors affecting 
premiums may be valued by employees at their cost to the employer.  
                                                 
7 See Kaiser (2011). 
8 A regression of the teacher premium copayment as a fraction of the total cost of a family policy on a linear 
time trend shows a very small increase over time of 0.0015 points per year. This estimate is statistically 
different from zero (p-value= .045). 
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Following Summers (1989), the take-home wage and employment adjustments to premium 
increases depend on how the premium increases compare to the change in the value employees 
place on the policy. For example, a decrease in a health insurance plan’s annual deductible will 
reduce enrollee’s out-of-pocket costs and therefore increase the valuation employees place on the 
plan. Thus, we would expect to find that an increase in premiums that derive from a reduction in the 
deductible to be offset by a reduction in take-home salary. Indeed, Royalty (2008) finds that workers 
are willing to give up more than a dollar in wages to get an additional dollar’s worth of observable 
plan generosity (such as a lower deductible).  
The preceding discussion is based on a competitive labor market where wages and benefits 
are set in the absence of a union. All public primary and secondary school teachers in Illinois are 
represented by a local union, as we describe below. As previous studies have noted, the bargaining 
goals of the union will not reflect those of a union member who is on the margin of working for the 
firm, but will more likely reflect the preferences of the median union member.9  In the context of 
health benefits, the evidence suggests unions will place more value on health benefits compared to 
the typically younger marginal worker in a non-union firm because the median union member is 
likely to be an older worker with a greater demand for health care.10 Importantly, however, union 
and district compensation negotiations will set the union’s marginal rate of substitution between 
wages and benefits equal to the districts marginal willingness to trade-off benefits for wages. A 
unionized setting does not itself imply that the trade-off between wages and insurance vanishes. A 
strong union will bargain to increase total compensation, but will also be willing to trade-off health 
insurance for salary.   
 
3. Estimating the value of health insurance using data on Illinois public school teachers 
 We use data from Illinois public school teacher contacts to overcome many of the empirical 
obstacles detailed above. The Illinois State Board of Education has conducted a survey of school 
                                                 
9 See Goldstein and Pauly (1976); Freeman and Medoff (1984); and Farber (1986). 
10 See Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
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districts since the early 1990s that collects information on salaries paid to teachers at different points 
of the salary schedule, the cost of an individual and family health insurance policies (if these policies 
are offered to teachers), and teacher premium copayments for each of these policies. We use data 
from primary and secondary school districts in the state that participated in the survey from 
academic years 1991-92 through 2008-09. There are over 800 districts in the state, though the exact 
number varies from year to year as some districts consolidated and others were created. Virtually all 
public school teachers are represented by an affiliate of the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) or 
the Illinois Education Association (IEA).  An IEA affiliate represented teachers in 76 percent of the 
districts and an IFT affiliate represented teachers in 23 percent of districts and the remaining 
districts had an unaffiliated local union over our study period.  Each school district negotiates a 
contract (usually a multi-year agreement) with their local union under state legislation that gives 
teachers the right to strike after proper notification is given to the district of their intent to strike.   
 In virtually all primary and secondary school districts in Illinois, a teacher's nine-month 
salary is exactly determined by where their education level and years of teaching experience place 
them on a two-dimensional salary grid. The salary survey data includes information for seven points 
on this grid: the minimum salary for a teacher with a BA, the maximum salary for a teacher with a 
BA, the MA minimum, the MA maximum, a teacher who has an MA and 10 years of experience, the 
minimum salary for a teacher who has an MA and 30-32 credits, and a the maximum salary for a 
teacher who has an MA plus 30-32 credits-maximum.  The “minimum” salary points specify the 
compensation for a teacher beginning their teaching career and the salary “maximum” describes pay 
for someone whose experience equals the salary schedule maximum. The number of years of 
experience required to reach the salary maximum (conditional on education) varies across districts.  
In some districts the parties have negotiated “longevity pay” which provides an additional yearly 
salary increment for teachers whose years of service place them at the maximum step (years) on the 
salary grid for their years of education. This longevity pay increment is smaller than the pay 
increment provided by advancing a step on the salary grid.  For teachers with a BA (MA) degree the 
average percentage salary increase for a year of service was 2.70 (2.66) percent for years up to the 
grid maximum and in districts with longevity pay the average yearly increment was 1.68 (0.82) 
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percent for each year of service beyond the maximum years on the salary grid.11  We convert all 
monetary variables, such as salaries and health insurance costs, to July 2009 dollars using the national 
CPI for all items.   
 These data have several strengths that allow us to address the difficulties described above. By 
estimating a model of the salary paid to teachers with a specific level of credentials (i.e. a master’s 
degree and ten years of teaching experience), we implicitly control for these two measures of worker 
productivity. In a typical survey (such as the Current Population Survey), experience is often 
measured imprecisely or not at all and years of education fails to capture the specific kind of training 
that affects pay.  The data we use describes the pay for a college graduate certified to teach in Illinois 
who has a particular configuration of credentials. That is, we estimate the wage trade-off for a 
particular job, not for a particular person. This distinction is important because it allows us to 
abstract from unmeasureable differences in tastes and productivity across people. Of course there is 
substantial variation across districts in the salary schedules and these differences may capture other 
important differences in teacher quality that are not captured by education and experience. Our 
models will attempt to address this by using district fixed-effect models. Moreover, since the analysis 
is based on data from a single occupation, the wage data do not include unmeasured selection effects 
related to occupational choice that could be correlated with health insurance premiums or salary.   
 Most importantly, the data give us access to precise information on insurance costs that are 
not typically available in other nationally-representative data sources. For each district in each year, 
the survey includes information on the total premiums for health/hospitalization insurance, 
prescription drug insurance, disability insurance, life insurance, vision insurance, and dental 
insurance. Districts report the cost for a single individual (i.e. the teacher) and the extra cost to cover 
a teacher’s spouse and/or dependents. If districts offer more than one plan, they are instructed to 
                                                 
11 Typically the number of yearly “steps” on the salary grid was greater for teachers with an MA degree.  The 
average number of years it took a teacher with a BA to reach the salary grid maximum was 15.5 years for 
districts offering longevity pay to BA certified teachers.  In contrast, the average number of years it took MA 




report the cost of the most expensive plan. Unfortunately, the data does not include information 
about the number of plans offered. We do not know any details about the plan itself, such as what 
services are covered, cost sharing, etc. We also do not know the insurance take-up rate. Districts 
report the fraction of the cost of each type of insurance that is paid by the district; we refer to the 
balance paid by the teacher as the teacher premium copayment. Finally, we analyze the combination 
of health/hospitalization coverage and prescription drug coverage together. Many districts report a 
single cost for both of these forms of coverage and so it is not possible to analyze them separately. 
We do not study the other forms of insurance.  
 We also only include districts that reported that they offer insurance in all periods in which 
they participated in the survey. In any given year, about 10 to 15 percent of districts that participate 
in the survey do not report a cost associated with their health insurance policy. This could mean that 
the district does not offer health insurance at all. However, in most such cases, the particular year 
with missing data is both preceded by, and followed by, years in which they report that they offer 
health insurance. This leads us to suspect that the missing data reflect a lack of reporting rather than 
a lack of health insurance. So we opt to focus on a sample of districts that report offering insurance 
in each year that they participate in the survey. As a practical matter, our estimates are not sensitive 
to including these observations in the analysis or to running models where the salaries are regressed 
on an indicator that the district reported a cost of insurance.12  
Table 1 and Figure 1 provide descriptive information on salaries at our sample schools. 
Figure 1 shows inflation-adjusted average salaries for five points in the salary schedule over time. 
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of salaries in 1991, 2000, and 2008. To be clear, 
these data do not represent the average salaries over teachers with each particular configuration of 
credentials; rather, they represent the average salaries over districts with each district receiving equal 
weight. The table and figure indicate that there was very little real growth in salaries over this 18-year 
period. In 1991, the average salary for a teacher with a BA and no teaching experience was $29,429 
                                                 
12 Each year, districts report the month and year that their current labor contract expires. In the regressions in 
Section 4, we estimate models based only on the first year of each contract. As such, we drop observations 
that do not have a valid year of expiration of the contract. 
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(in 2009 dollars); in 2008 the starting salary was $30,906. This change corresponds to an annual 
growth rate of 0.3 percent per year. The average maximum salary that a teacher with a BA could 
earn was $43,702 in 1991, or 48.5 percent more than the starting salary for a teacher with a BA. The 
average starting salary for a teacher with an MA in 1991 was $32,453, or 10.3 percent higher than the 
salary for a similarly new teacher who only has a BA.  
Figure 2 shows the unweighted average premium for individual health insurance and 
prescription drug coverage and the average additional premium to cover family members between 
1991 and 2008 (these premiums are expressed in 2009 dollars). The averages for 1991, 2000, and 
2008 are also reported in Table 1. Individual premiums rose by 89 percent from $2,969 in 1991 to 
$5,622 in 2008, or 3.8 percent per year. Family premiums rose at a 4.6 percent annual rate, from 
$5,101 to $10,972.  
Insurance premiums for teachers in Illinois were slightly more expensive, but grew at a 
slightly slower rate, than the national average. The Kaiser/HRET survey began in 1999 and collects 
information on the characteristics of employer-provided health insurance plans in the private sector 
and state and local governments (Kaiser 2011). The average premium for individual insurance in 
2000 was $3,090, about 20 percent less than the average cost of individual insurance for Illinois 
teachers that year. The premium in 2008 was $4,708, about 16 percent less than cost in Illinois. The 
average annual growth rate of individual insurance premiums in the Kaiser data between 2000 and 
2008 was 5.4 percent per year. 
Districts increasingly relied on premium copayments to cover a portion of individual and 
family health insurance costs. Figure 3 shows the fraction of districts that had any premium 
copayment and Figures 4a shows the unconditional average copayment for individual insurance and 
the copayment conditional on having a positive copayment. Table 1 shows the unconditional 
average copayment as a fraction of the average premium in 1991, 2000, and 2008. 39.5 percent of 
districts had a copayment for individual insurance in 1991 and the average copayment among 
districts that had one was $672, or 23.6 percent of the average premium in these districts. The 
unconditional average copayment (including zeros for districts without any copayment) was $266, 
which represents 9.3 percent of the average premium that year. By 2008 57.6 percent of districts had 
a copayment for individual insurance and the average copayment among those that had one was 
$1042, or 18.9 percent of the average premium in these districts. The unconditional average 
14 
 
copayment was $601, or 10.9 percent of the average premium that year. So more districts adopted 
copayments for individual insurance over time, but the fraction of premiums covered by teacher 
copayments increased by only 1.6 percentage points. Another way to view the role of premium 
copayments is to note that the real average premium rose by $2653 between 1991 and 2008; $335 
dollars of this, or 12.6 percent, was paid by teachers directly through increased premium 
copayments. Districts real expenditures on individual health insurance increased by an average of 
$2318 per teacher. 
Premium copayments are more important for family insurance. Figure 4b shows the 
unconditional average copayment for family insurance and the copayment conditional on having a 
positive copayment. 81.7 percent of districts had a copayment for individual insurance in 1991 and 
the average copayment among districts that had one was $3371, or 68.6 percent of the average 
premium in these districts. The unconditional average copayment (including zeros for districts 
without any copayment) was $2758, which represents 60.9 percent of the average premium that year. 
By 2008 90.7 percent of districts had a copayment for individual insurance and the average 
copayment among those that had one was $6429, or 60.8 percent of the average premium in these 
districts. The unconditional average copayment was $5834, or 59.8 percent of the average premium 
that year. As with individual insurance, school districts adopted copayments for family insurance 
over time and, indeed, by 2008 nine out of 10 districts had a copayment. The fraction of premiums 
covered by teacher copayments remained essentially the same over time. Between 1991 and 2008 
real average premiums for family insurance rose by $5419; $3076 dollars of this, or 56.8 percent, was 
paid by teachers directly through increased premium copayments. Districts real expenditures on 
family health insurance increased by $2343 per enrolled family, on average, which is almost exactly 
the increase that districts paid for individual insurance during this period. 
 Figure 5 shows the cross-sectional relationship in 2008 between premiums for individual 
health insurance and the salary for a teacher with a master’s degree and 10 years of teaching 
experience. The slope of a bivariate regression line through the data is 0.58 with a standard error of 
0.27, which indicates that a $100 increase in premiums is associated with $58 higher salary. We 
interpret this positive cross-sectional relationship as a reflection of other, potentially unobservable 
factors that lead some districts to offer both high wages and more expensive health insurance. For 
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example, districts in richer neighborhoods are likely to offer relatively higher compensation to attract 
and retain high-quality teachers.  
The advantage of panel data is that we can correlate changes in the cost of insurance in a 
particular district over time with changes in the premium copayments and salaries in the district and 
purge any time-invariant district characteristics. Figure 6 shows the relationship between changes in 
the real cost of individual health insurance between 1999-2001 and 2006-2008, on the one hand, and 
the change in the real salary paid to a teacher with an MA and ten years of teaching experience.13 
The scatter plot reveals that there is quite a bit of variation in the real change in health insurance 
costs during this period, with many experiencing little or no growth and others experiencing 
upwards of a $5000 increase in insurance costs. The slope of the bivariate regression line is 0.03 with 
a standard error of 0.10. That is, changes in health insurance costs are virtually uncorrelated with 
changes in salary; a $100 increase in premiums is associated with a $3 increase in wages, though the 
estimate is not statistically different from zero. Importantly, virtually all of the positive correlation in 
the cross-section disappears once we look at within-district changes.  That pattern remains once we 
move to the regression framework in Section 4.  
Finally, Figure 7 is a scatter plot of changes in the real cost of individual health insurance 
between 1999-2001 and 2006-2008, on the one hand, and changes in the premium copayment for 
this insurance. The slope of the bivariate regression line is 0.21 with a standard error of 0.02, 
indicating that a $100 increase in premiums is associated with a $21 increase in teachers’ premium 
copayment. 
 
4. Regression estimates of the relationship between premiums, salary, and copayments. 
 This section presents regression estimates of the relationship between health insurance 
premiums, salaries, and premium copayments. The basic wage regression is  
(2)     =  + ℎ +  ! + $ + % + & 
where  is a point on the salary schedule (such as the starting salary for teacher with a BA) of 
district i in year t. ℎ is the total annual health insurance premium for either the teacher or for 
                                                 
13 Averaging over three years reduces the attenuating effect of measurement error. 
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family members. ! represents time-varying covariates and includes the log of average daily 
attendance in the district, the log of real assessed value of local property per student in the district, 
and the log of real federal and state aid to the district per student. The non-compensation data are 
collected separately by the Illinois State Board of Education. Our preferred specification includes 
both district  (%) and year fixed effects ($). To highlight that the cross-sectional correlation 
between salaries and health insurance is quite different from the correlation within districts over 
time, we also present models that omit the district fixed effects.14   Finally, & represents the 
unobservable error term. We also present similar models of the copayment, , for individual or 
family insurance as a function of health insurance premiums.  
  As we noted above, we estimate these models only using observations associated with the 
first year of each district contract. Most contracts last between one and three years. If wages are 
fixed (or change in a pre-determined manner) during the course of a contract, while the cost of 
health insurance is adjusted annually, then including observations from each year in the regression 
will tend to underestimate the responsiveness of wages to health insurance costs.  Including these 
observations would also heighten biases associated with misspecification of any lag structure 
between changes in health insurance and changes in wages. As a practical matter, our estimates are 
virtually unchanged if we include all years of each contract. 
 Our preferred regression estimates include district and year fixed effects. This means that 
identifying variation in health insurance premiums comes from differential changes in premiums 
within districts over time. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, premiums rose (or fell) more in some 
districts than in others. This variation in premiums could come from a number of sources:  districts 
could alter the details of their insurance plans by, for example, changing their physician network, the 
degree of cost sharing, switching between and HMO and a PPO. Within-district changes in 
premiums could also result from different health experiences of teachers and their families, as 
premiums rise disproportionately more in districts that experience more adverse health events.  
The near steady increase in real premium costs (See Figure 2) over the 18 year study period 
suggests that the premium increases in our data are being driven by the continual increase in the cost 
                                                 
14 We cluster the standard errors at the school district level in models that do not contain district fixed effects.  
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of medical care and the major factor thought to explain the persistently high level of growth in 
medical spending in the U.S. over the last fifty years is technological innovations in medical care 
(Chernew & Newhouse 2011).  In our study the premium variation used to identify the impact of 
health insurance premiums on salaries and teacher copays could come from the uneven impact of 
new technologies on the local cost of health care if there is variation across health markets in the 
adoption rates of new medical technologies.  Evidence suggesting this may be important come from 
numerous studies (e.g. Phelps 2000; Skinner 2011) that show the adoption rates of new medical 
technology vary across markets for reasons not easily explained by prices, income or characteristics 
of the patient population, even when the technology is low cost and clearly clinically effective.15  
Differences in adoption rates of new technology across markets for a single technology will generate 
different changes in health insurance premium costs across employers.  More importantly, the 
continual development of new medical technologies, their uncertain impact on health care 
expenditures and differences in adoption rates across health care markets, suggest health insurance 
premiums over time and across employers are subject to random shocks that reflect the stream of 
past innovations and heterogeneity in adoption rates across both technologies and health care 
markets.  
Though we do not have data on the diffusion and development of new technologies in 
Illinois that might directly explain this premium variation, we can provide indirect evidence that 
shows this premium variation is correlated with the identity of the hospital markets where each 
school district is located.  To show this, first note that the variation in premium costs used to 
identify the impact of premiums on salaries and teacher copays in models with school district and 
year fixed effects is the variation in premiums defined by the complete set of school district and year 
interactions.  We constructed this residual variation in premiums by regressing health insurance 
premiums for individual coverage on the three variables included in the salary and copay regressions 
                                                 
15 For example, in 1985 the medical evidence clearly showed that taking beta blockers after an individual has 
had a heart attack is both very cost effective and it substantially improves health outcomes.  However, by 
2000-2001 state level data show that only 2/3 of the patients that should take beta blockers were taking beta 
blockers in the median state (Skinner and Staiger 2007). 
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(district size, district wealth and federal and state aid) plus school district and year fixed effects.    
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has identified the different geographic 
markets served by acute care hospitals in the U.S.  The identity of the hospital market serving each 
school district was determined by matching each school district to one of the 19 different hospital 
referral regions in Illinois using zipcode information. The health premium residuals were then 
regressed on a set of year, hospital referral region, and year by hospital referral region indicator 
variables.  Without the interaction terms the main effects of year and hospital market were each 
jointly different from zero with p-values less than .0001 and an R2 of .096.  The R2 increased to .146 
when the year by hospital referral region indicators were added to the model.16  These estimates 
indicate that a significant amount of the variation in premiums used to identify the impact of 
premiums on salaries and copays is related to the markets served by the different hospitals in the 
state.  This market-level premium variation could be caused by differences in technological 
diffusion, but could also reflect differences across markets in physician practice styles, the wages of 
medical service providers, among other things.  
 Table 2 presents results of OLS regressions of the annual premium for individual health 
insurance on the minimum and maximum salaries for teachers with a B.A. (in Panels A and B) and 
an M.A. (in Panels C and D).17 Results in the first model in Panel A, which does not include district 
fixed effects, indicates that a dollar increase in the premium for individual health insurance is 
associated with a 0.19 dollar increase in the salary for a teacher who has a B.A. degree but no 
teaching experience. The second model includes district fixed effects and indicates that within-
district changes in the cost of health insurance are virtually uncorrelated with salaries. The point 
estimate indicates that a dollar increase in the premium is associated with a 0.007 dollar decrease in 
the starting salary for a teacher with a B.A. The standard error on this estimate is 0.03, which 
effectively rules out any economically meaningful wage offset.  
                                                 
16 The regression results for the family premium are very similar to the individual premium results. 
17 Results are virtually identical to those reported when salaries are measured for a teacher with an MA and 10 
years of experience or for a teacher at the top of the salary schedule receiving longevity pay. 
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 The remaining panels of Table 2 confirm that within-district changes in health insurance 
premiums are uncorrelated with changes in teachers’ salaries. The point estimates indicate that a 
dollar increase in the real premium for individual health insurance is associated with a 0.03 dollar 
increase in the maximum salary paid to a teacher with a BA degree, though this estimate is not 
different from zero. The point estimates for models of the minimum and maximum salary paid to a 
teacher with an MA indicate that these fall by 0.018 and 0.073 dollars for a dollar increase in health 
costs. Again, these estimates are not statistically different from zero. 
 Estimates in Table 3 indicate that changes in the premium for family members’ insurance are 
not meaningfully correlated with changes in teachers’ salaries. The first estimate in Panel A, which 
does not include district fixed effects, indicates that a dollar increase in the premium for family 
insurance is associated with a 5 cent increase in the salary for a teacher who has a B.A. and no 
teaching experience. The standard error on this estimate is 0.03 (or 3 cents) and so the estimate is 
not statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, unlike the models of 
the cost of individual insurance which showed quite strong cross-sectional correlations between 
health insurance costs and wages, these models show very little cross-sectional correlation. Our 
preferred estimates are those that include district fixed effects and these too show very small, if any, 
correlation between changes in the cost of family health insurance and salaries. For example, the 
second column of Panel A indicates shows that a dollar increase in the cost of a family health 
insurance plan is associated with 0.02 dollar increase in the salary of teachers who have a B.A. and 
no teaching experience. The standard error of this estimate is 0.01, and so the coefficient is 
statistically different from zero, but is nevertheless close enough to zero to not be meaningfully 
different. The other panels also show small, positive associations between changes in the cost of 
family health insurance plans and teachers’ salaries. Our interpretation of these positive estimates 
that they may reflect a small upward bias as districts that offer more expensive family plans also pay 
higher wages. However, there is no reason to believe that this bias is large enough to mask large 
wage offsets.  
 Teachers pay a meaningful portion of their health insurance costs through premium 
copayments, as documented in Table 4. The left two columns show results from models of the 
copayment for individual insurance on the premium for individual insurance, without and with 
district fixed effects. The model that includes fixed effects, column 2, indicates that a dollar increase 
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in the premium for individual health insurance is associated with a 0.17 dollar increase in teachers’ 
premium copayment. The standard error on this estimate is 0.01. The model without district fixed 
effects produces a coefficient of 0.16. The third and fourth columns present estimates of the effect 
of premiums for family health insurance on the copayment for family insurance. The fourth column, 
which shows results from a model that includes district fixed effects, indicates that a dollar increase 
in the premium for family health insurance is associated with a 0.46 dollar increase in the premium 
copayment. The standard error on this estimate is 0.01. The model that does not include a district 
fixed effect produces a coefficient of 0.40.  
The last two columns of Table 4 present models where the dependent variable is the sum of 
the copayments for individual and family coverage (recall that, in this survey, “family coverage” 
refers to the additional costs to cover a teacher’s spouse and/or dependents). The penultimate 
column includes the premiums for individual and family coverage separately in the regression and 
the results are largely the same as those in columns 2 and 4. The final column models the combined 
copayment as a function of the combined premium and the results indicate that a dollar increase in 
the combined premium is associated with a 0.41 dollar increase in the copayment. This indicates  
most of the variation in the combined premium and copayments stems from variation in the family 
premium and copayment.  
The conclusion from Tables 2 and 3 is that changes over time within a district in the cost of 
individual and family health insurance plans are largely uncorrelated with changes in teachers’ 
salaries. However, Table 4 shows that teachers pay about 17 percent of the cost of individual 
insurance and about 46 percent of the cost of family members’ insurance through premium 
copayments. These conclusions are robust to a host of alternative specifications.18 The lack of 
                                                 
18 The Teacher Service Records that we discuss in Section 5 also contain information on the salaries of the 
school district superintendent, elementary school principals, junior high school principals, and high school 
principals and we ran models of their salaries as a function of teachers’ health insurance premiums. 
Interestingly, here we did find evidence of a negative association between insurance and wages. For example, 
pooling all of these administrators together, we find that a dollar increase in teachers’ individual health 
insurance is associated with a 0.345 dollar decline in salary (with a standard error of 0.178). The 
administrators are not part of the teachers’ labor union and we suspect that this may help explain why there is 
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correlation between wage and premium changes is not driven by wages being fixed within  a multi-
year contract because our estimates are based on changes from one contract to the next. Figure 6 
showed a similar lack of correlation between changes in wages and premiums between 1999 and 
2008, which gives us further confidence that our results aren’t driven by shorter-term wage 
stickiness or the presence of measurement error in the premium data. 
 
5. The impact of the teacher experience distribution on wage and premium copayment 
offsets 
 As noted earlier, several studies have found the wage offset from health insurance benefits 
are larger for some demographic groups that have higher than average expected health care 
expenditures.  These findings could reflect sorting across employers where groups with higher health 
care needs work for employers with more generous health insurance and are willing to accept lower 
cash compensation because of the higher value they place on the better coverage relative to other 
groups.  These effects could also reflect within-firm wage differentials between workers based on 
their expected utilization of health care services. Our data are uniquely suited for estimating how 
both salary and premium copayments adjust within districts over time because we have information 
on the distribution of teachers’ experience within each school district for the final seven years of our 
study period. We use individual teacher-level data from the Illinois Board of Education’s Teacher 
Service Records (TSR). These are administrative data reported by districts to the state Board of 
Education and contain one record per teacher, administrator, and staff member in the school. The 
data contain information on the highest degree held; years of experience in the district, state, and out 
of state; and the individual’s job, among other things. This data is available beginning in 2002. 
To assess the differential impact of premiums on districts that employ teachers with higher-
tenured teachers, we first compute the 20th through 80th percentile of the distribution of tenure 
within each district in each year. We then augment Equation 2 with the seven values for these deciles 
of the experience distribution and the seven decile values interacted with a health insurance 
                                                                                                                                                             
a wage offset for them. Alternatively, it could be that administrators do not pay premium copayments. In any 
case, we do not have the data to further address these findings.  
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premium measure. We estimated models of both wages and copayments, but only models of the 
copayments showed statistically significant effects and so we focus on those. Panel A of Appendix 
Table 1 shows results from two models: the dependent variable in the first column is the copayment 
for family insurance and the premium measure is the premium for family insurance. The dependent 
variable in the second column is the sum of the copayments individual and family insurance and the 
premium measure is sum of premiums for individual and family insurance. The remaining rows 
show the coefficients on the main effects of the 20th through 80th percentiles of each districts tenure 
distribution and the interactions between these and the premium measure. In both models, the main 
effects and interaction effects are jointly statistically different from zero.19  
Table 5 translates the estimates in Appendix Table 1 by reporting ∂(Family Copay)/∂(Family 
Premium) evaluated at hypothetical teacher tenure distributions that correspond to a “less 
experienced”, “ average experienced”, and “highly experienced” teacher workforce. These 
distributions of teacher experience are presented in Panel B of Appendix Table 1 and correspond to 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of each point in the tenure distribution across districts. For 
example, the top row of Panel B indicates that the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the 20th percentile 
of the within-firm distribution were equal to  3, 4 and 6 years. The first column indicates that our 
hypothetical district with a “less experienced” workforce had a median value of teacher tenure of 
nine years. The “average experienced” district had a median value of 11 year and the “highly 
experienced” district had a median tenure of 14 years.  
The first row of Table 5 shows ∂(Family Copay)/∂(Family Premium)  is equal to $0.41 in the 
“less experienced” workforce, $0.46 for the average workforce and $0.56 for the “highly 
experienced” workforce. That is, districts with longer-tenured teachers tend to have larger premium 
copayments. The larger gap between the average and more experienced workforce compared to the 
                                                 
19 We also estimated simpler models with interactions between the premium and just the district’s mean or 
median level of teaching experience.  These interaction terms were statistically significant in all of the teacher 
copay models and the magnitudes of the estimated effects were larger for the model with mean tenure, but 
both estimates of the offset effects were smaller than the estimates using the seven points of the tenure 




gap between the less experienced and average workforce is because the difference  in years of 
experience for most of the seven decile values is greater between the 75th and 50th percentiles than 
between the 25th and 50th percentile.  The last column of numbers shows the estimated effect of 
aging any of the distributions by one year.  A rightward shift of the experience distribution by one 
year increases the copay by three cents for every dollar increase in the family premium. 
The second row of Table 5 show estimates of ∂(Individual + Family Copay) / 
∂(Individual+Family Premium); the change in the total copay for teacher and family coverage with 
respect to a change in the total cost of covering both the teacher and his/her dependents.  
Compared to the first row, which shows the marginal change in the copay relative to a change in the 
marginal cost of family coverage, these copayment offsets are about six percentage points smaller 
for each of the three tenure distributions.  Finally, the estimated effect of a one year shift in the 
tenure distribution is only slightly larger ($0.031 versus $0.033).  This suggests that virtually all of the 
effect of the teacher experience distribution on the total copay for self and dependent coverage is 
due to the impact of experience on the marginal change in the family copay response to a marginal 
change in the cost of the family coverage premium.21  
These results are consistent with the results reported in Tables 2-4; all the adjustment in cash 
compensation to changes in health insurance premium costs come through changes in teacher 
premium copayments rather than adjustments to salary.  The estimates indicate that the teachers in 
districts with a more experienced and older workforce place a greater value on the health benefits 
associated with higher family premiums relative to a district with a less experienced and younger 
workforce. 
   
6. Understanding how health insurance costs influence school districts 
 Teachers’ premium copayments account for about 17 percent of the cost of individual 
insurance and about 46 percent of the cost of family insurance. The tax exclusion can account for 
                                                 
21 We formally confirmed this conclusion by including the tenure interaction terms in the Individual copay = 
f(individual premium) model.  The experience and experience by individual premium terms were jointly 
insignificant in this model. 
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perhaps 15 to 25 percent of the cost, depending on the average marginal tax rate of teachers in the 
district. This implies that a large share of the incidence of health insurance costs falls on the district. 
This section explores alternative hypotheses that could explain how schools respond to increased 
health insurance costs.  
When faced with higher compensation costs, do districts simply move up their labor demand 
schedule and hire fewer teachers? Estimates presented in Table 6 indicate that the answer is no. This 
table reports results of regressions of the log of the number of teachers in a district on the log of 
various compensation measures. These models all include district fixed effects and the log of average 
daily attendance in the district, the log of real assessed value of local property per student in the 
district, and the log of real federal and state aid to the district per student. These are essentially 
regressions of quantities on prices and are therefore potentially subject to the standard concerns 
about simultaneity. However, because we are dealing with union negotiated contracts where teachers 
have negotiated a wage premium above market wages, if school boards are free to set employment 
levels, these estimates reflect movement along the labor demand curve.22 The model in column 1 
separately includes the log of the salary for a teacher with an M.A. and 10 years of teaching 
experience, the log of the premium for individual health insurance, and the log of teachers’ premium 
copayment. None of the compensation variables is statistically associated with the log of the total 
number of teachers in the district. Columns 2 and 3 present results from alternative specifications. 
Column 2 includes the log of salary and the log of the difference between the health insurance 
premium and the teacher’s copayment. Column 3 simply includes the log of the salary plus the 
individual health insurance premium less the teacher’s copayment. Neither of these specifications 
                                                 
22 This ignores two potentially confounding factors.  First, employment will not fall on the district’s 
labor demand curve if the parties bargain for the more efficient contract that sets both salaries and 
employment levels rather than just compensation levels (Brown and Ashenfelter 1986, MaCurdy and 
Pencavel 1986)  For a discussion of this literature see Pencavel (1991) and Booth (1995).  Second, many of 
the school districts in the state are in lightly populated rural areas where districts may have some monopsony 
power.  We leave these issues for later research and view our estimates as suggestive of a relationship between 




reveal any statistically significant correlation between the number of teachers and measures of 
compensation.  
 The remaining columns of Table 6 report the relationship between compensation measures 
and the number of pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, elementary school, and secondary school 
teachers, and teachers in ungraded classrooms (such as music teachers). While some of these models 
do show a statistically significant relationship between the district’s health insurance cost and the 
number of teachers, the effect sizes are uniformly small and of inconsistent signs: In two models the 
premium is negatively associated with the number of teachers; in one model the premium is 
positively associated with the number of teachers; and in two models the coefficient on the premium 
is not statistically different from zero. We have also run models of the log of the number of non-
teacher employees, such as guidance counselors, administrators, and staff, on the teachers’ 
compensation measures and similarly found no evidence of a relationship. We conclude that 
increased health insurance costs do not seem to lead to reductions in the number of school 
employees.  
Next we assess whether districts respond to rising health insurance costs by switching to 
less-educated or less-experienced teachers to reduce their total compensation costs. For this analysis 
we use the individual teacher-level data described in Section 5. From these individual records, we 
calculate the percentiles of the distribution of total teaching experience among teachers in each 
district and the fraction of teachers in the district who have a master’s degree or more education and 
match these to the district health insurance and compensation records.  
Table 7 reports results of regression models of the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of 
the distribution of teacher experience on the log of the salary for a teacher with an MA and 10 years 
of teaching experience, the log of the premium for individual health insurance (less the teacher 
copayment), district fixed effects, and the three covariates included in previous models. The means 
of the level (rather than logs) of each dependent variable are included at the bottom of the table. 
The estimates indicate there is no statistically significant relationship between health insurance costs 
and the distribution of teacher experience. The final column of Table 7 indicates that rising health 
insurance costs is positively associated with the fraction of teachers with an MA degree. Even 
though this estimate is statistically different from zero and the opposite sign from what we expect, 
the magnitude of the estimate is extremely small: a doubling of real health insurance costs is only 
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associated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in the fraction of teaches with an MA, from a base of 
42 percent. Taken together with the results in Table 6, it seems clear that rising health insurance 
costs have no impact districts’ demand for labor, both in terms of the number of teachers or their 
skill level.23  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 Health insurance premiums for Illinois public school teachers increased dramatically over 
the past twenty years, just as they did nationally. Our analysis indicates quite clearly that changes in 
premiums within a district over time are uncorrelated with changes in salary. Teachers’ take-home 
pay is reduced by approximately 17 percent of the cost of individual health insurance, and 46 
percent of the cost to insure family members, through premium copayments. The offset is larger in 
districts with relatively higher-tenured teachers. Since teacher premium copayments are paid from 
pre-tax dollars, the impact of teacher premium copays on after-tax teacher take-home pay is 
substantially less than $.17 or $.46 copay for each dollar increase in premium costs.  
 We offer two potential interpretations of our findings that each have important implications 
for thinking about health insurance and compensation. First, the lack of a full offset indicates that 
premium increases were not associated with commensurate increases in teachers’ valuation of their 
health insurance plans. Several previous studies are consistent with this interpretation.  Evidence 
presented by Royalty (2008) indicates that employees highly value observable measures of health 
                                                 
23 We also used data from the National Center for Education Statistics’ School Finance Survey to verify some 
of our results. This data contains aggregate school budget variables, such as total annual revenue and 
expenditures, by category, though it does not separate spending on health insurance from spending on other 
employee benefits. We found that total spending on employee benefits is positively associated with health 
insurance premiums and with total instructional spending in regression models that also control for the 
district-level covariates, year effects, and districts effects. Consistent with the regressions reported in the text, 
we found no association between premiums and spending on salaries for instructional staff. Since we do not 
know the insurance take-up rate, whether districts offer multiple health insurance policies, or how much they 
spend on other employee benefits, it is difficult to push these data further.  
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plan generosity.  The widely cited paper by Gruber (1994) can be interpreted to show employees 
only accept wage offsets when premiums increase when they value the medical care changes driving 
the premium increases.  Gruber finds a complete wage offset for the cost of maternity care among 
married women of child-bearing age when states required that insurance policies cover maternity 
costs.  This conclusion was based on a “difference-in-difference-in-difference” estimator comparing 
the difference in wage changes before and after the state mandates between married women 20-40 
years old and men either over 40 or single men 20-40 years old   For the female sample there was a 
significant wage decline after the mandate was passed but for the comparison group of men there 
was no significant change in mean wages  This suggests the control group of men placed no value 
on the health benefits provided by maternity coverage.  However, since married women of 
childbearing age are not employed in gender segregated establishments, firms employing both men 
and women faced higher premium costs because of the maternity mandate but only married women 
20-40 years old valued these benefits as indicated by their willingness to accept lower wages 
following the mandate.  Our estimates that show more experienced and older teacher workforces are 
willing to accept higher premium copayments when premiums increase compared to less 
experienced workforces is consistent with the previous research that shows wage offsets only for 
demographic groups that value the benefits changes driving the premium cost increases.  As noted 
earlier, because technological innovation is the  leading cause of the overall growth in health care 
costs in the U.S., our estimates suggest the technologies driving the cost increases are more highly 
valued by older workers but, on average, these benefits are not valued by employees at their cost to 
the employer .  
 A second potential explanation for our results is that both employees and employers are 
concerned about the uncertain changes in future health insurance costs. If changes in the cost of 
health insurance are driven by technological innovation in the health care sector, then the premium 
cost increases are unpredictable to teachers and local taxpayers and the parties negotiate over how 
this risk is shared when they agree to a teacher premium copay because unpredictable changes in 
health insurance premiums impose a cost on both employers and employees  A full wage offset, as 
predicted by the traditional model of employee benefits, implies that employees bear all of the risk 
associated with uncertain health insurance costs. Similarly, the degree to which employers’ bear the 
burden will generate unpredictable fluctuations in their labor costs and local school budgets. If local 
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taxpayers are more able or willing to take on some this  risks, then we would expect to find less than 
full wage offset. Testing between these two explanations for less than a full wage offset for health 
insurance premiums will require better data on the characteristics of insurance policies and the 
factors generating changes in insurance premium costs. 
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BA minimum salary $29,429 $30,794 $30,906
(4,084) (4,078) (4,289)
BA maximum salary 43,702 45,755 45,867
(7,887) (7,693) (8,002)
MA minimum salary 32,453 34,119 34,226
(4,863) (4,921) (5,104)
MA maximum salary 53,428 57,768 58,043
(12,240) (12,377) (12,352)
MA plus 10 year of experience 42,530 44,326 44,023
(8,195) (8,351) (8,532)
Premium for individual health insurance 2,969 3,900 5,622
(874) (930) (1,445)
Premium for family health insurance 5,101 6,602 10,972
(2,041) (2,386) (4,128)
Copayment for individual insurance 9.3% 8.7% 10.9%
(as a percentage of the total premium) (17.7) (15.4) (16.4)
Copayment for family health insurance 60.8 59.2 59.8
(as a percentage of the total premium) (39.1) (37.6) (34.7)
Number of disctricts 597 494 655
Note: All figures are in 2009 dollars. Copayment is the average fraction of the total 
premium that is paid by teachers for individual or family insurance, including zeros for 
teachers that have no copayment. Standard deviations in parentheses.





Premium for individual insurance 0.190** -0.00701 0.389** 0.0269
(0.0809) (0.0296) (0.186) (0.0788)
Obervations 3,604 3,604 3,604 3,604
Districts 686 686 686 686
District fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
Premium for individual insurance 0.260*** -0.0181 0.616*** -0.0731
(0.0981) (0.0337) (0.225) (0.0886)
Obervations 3,604 3,604 3,604 3,604
Districts 686 686 686 686
District fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Sample only includes districts that offered insurance in all contracts. All 
models contain control variables described in the text. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by school district.
Table 2: Regression estimates of the effect of individual health insurance on 
four points in the salary schedule
BA minimum BA Maximum





Premium for family insurance 0.0456 0.0239** -0.0181 0.0619**
-0.0326 -0.0114 -0.065 -0.031
Obervations 3,002 3,002 3,002 3,002
Districts 567 567 567 567
District fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
Premium for family insurance 0.0782* 0.0255** 0.0548 0.0141
-0.0435 -0.013 -0.079 -0.0349
Obervations 3,002 3,002 3,002 3,002
Districts 567 567 567 567
District fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Sample only includes districts that offered insurance in all contracts. All 
models contain control variables described in the text. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by school district.
Table 3: Regression estimates of the effect of family health insurance on four 
points in the salary schedule
MA minimum MA Maximum











Observations 3,624 3,624 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019
Districts 686 567 567
District fixed effects? No Yes No Yes Yes Yes




Note: Sample only includes districts that offered individual and/or family insurance in all contracts. All 
models contain control variables described in the text. In models without fixed effects, robust standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by school district. 
Table 4: Regression estimates of the effect of health insurance premiums on premium copayments
Premium for individual insurance
Premium for family insurance
Copayment for Copayment for





Low experience: Average experience: High experience:
f.25(.2), f.25(.3),f.25(.4) f.5(.2), f.5(.3),f.5(.4) f.75(.2), f.75(.3),f.75(.4) 1 year rightward
f.25(.5), f.25(.6) f.5(.5), f.5(.6) f.75(.5), f.75(.6)  shift in the
 f.25(.7),f.25(.8)  f.5(.7),f.5(.8)  f.75(.7),f.75(.8) experience distribution
∂Family copay/∂family premium 0.4072 0.4634 0.5576 0.0314
(0.0374) (0.0364) (0.0512) (0.0126)
∂(Individual + family copay)/ 0.3433 0.3972 0.4973 0.0334
∂(Individual + family Premium (0.0372) (0.0377) (0.0536) (0.0133)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculations based on parameter estimates reported in Appendix Table 1.
Table 5: The Estimated Impact of the Teacher Tenure Distibution on ∂Teacher Copay/∂Premium 



















0.0289 0.0352 0.253 0.248* 0.0929* -0.0809 -0.156
(0.0314) (0.0314) (0.296) (0.138) (0.0495) (0.0792) (0.112)




Premium less teacher copayment -0.0009 -0.0611* -0.0208 -0.0063 0.0215** -0.0361**
(0.0043) (0.0323) (0.0195) (0.0070) (0.0104) (0.0165)
Salary plus premium less copayment 0.0233
(0.0309)
Observations 3,075 3,049 3,075 1,193 2,412 2,468 1,860 2,186
Districts 646 645 646 344 548 560 506 555
District fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Sample only includes districts that offered insurance in all contracts. All models contain control variables described in the text. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school district.
Salary for a teacher with an MA & 
10 years of experience
Teacher's premium copayment for 
individual insurance
Log of the number of teachers in each district, by teacher type















-0.376 0.426 -6.015** -7.117** -4.508* -0.118
(1.469) (2.093) (2.767) (3.052) (2.508) (0.082)
Premium less teacher copayment 0.068 0.092 0.207 0.249 -0.047 0.010*
(0.102) (0.145) (0.191) (0.211) (0.173) (0.006)
Mean of dependent variable in levels 2.665 6.820 12.063 19.271 28.831 0.418
Observations 1235 1235 1235 1235 1235 1235
Districts 546 546 546 546 546 546
District fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Sample only includes districts that offered insurance in all contracts. All models contain control variables 
described in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by school district.
Salary for a teacher with an MA & 
10 years of experience
Percentiles of the distribution of teacher experience Fraction of 
teachers with 
an MA degree
Table 7: Regression estimates of the effect of components of compensation on the characteristics of 
teachers in a district
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1991 1996 2001 2006
Year for start of school year in the fall
BA Minimum BA Maximum
MA Minimum MA Maximum
MA with 10 years of experience
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Figure 2: Average health insurance premiums, 1991 to 2008 
 



















































































1991 1996 2001 2006
Year for start of school year in the fall
Individual coverage Additional cost for family coverage
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1991 1996 2001 2006
Year for start of school year in the fall
Individual insurance Family insurance
41 
 


















































1991 1996 2001 2006
Year for start of school year in the fall
All districts Only districts with a positive copayment
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Year for start of school year in the fall
All districts Districts with a positive copayment
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Family Copay Family Copay f.25(.) f.50(.) f.75(.)
Premium 0.150 0.0767
(0.141) (0.143)
20th Percentile of exper. 169.2 237.3 3 4 6
(238.7) (358.1)
30th Percentile of exper. -491.6* -750.3* 5 6 8
(252.9) (389.4)
40th Percentile of exper. -125.2 -153.6 7 9 11
(264.6) (410.3)
50th Percentile of exper. 337.2 422.1 9 11 14
(240.0) (374.6)
60th Percentile of exper. -96.37 -155.4 12 15 18
(206.3) (322.0)
70th Percentile of exper. -59.85 -5.110 15 19 23
(166.2) (262.9)
80th Percentile of exper. -89.46 -158.1 20 24 27
(121.1) (181.3)
Experience Values for 
Low, Average, and High 
Distributions (years):
Panel A: Panel B:
Estimates of the Teacher 
Experience Distribution on 
Premium Copays
Appendix Table 1




20th percentile x Premium -0.0217 -0.0174
(0.0203) (0.0209)
30th percentile x Premium 0.0584** 0.0551**
(0.0230) (0.0239)
40th percentile x Premium 0.00542 0.00376
(0.0248) (0.0258)
50th percentile x Premium -0.0366* -0.0304
(0.0213) (0.0226)
60th percentile x Premium 0.0214 0.0200
(0.0184) (0.0196)
70th percentile x Premium 0.00478 -0.000709
(0.0156) (0.0166)
80th percentile x Premium -0.000360 0.00307
(0.0106) (0.0109)
P-value for joint significance 0.0092 0.0261
of interaction terms
P-value for joint significance 0.0216 0.0544
of exper and exper x prem
interaction terms
Observations 1056 1056
Number of Districts 460 460
District fixed effects? Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The premium measure in the first column is the additional 
cost to cover teachers' family members. The premium measure in the 
second column is the sum of the individual premium and the family 
premium. Standard errors in parentheses.
Appendix Table 1, Panel A Continued
